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It is a great honour and a very special pleasure to be giving the Tenth
Sir R ichard Kirby

Lecture

in

Industrial

R elations,

the p lea su re

enha n ce d

by

the

presence here tonight of Sir Richard him self and Lady Kirby.

It is a great

privilege

to share the respect

and

to have known

affection

which

them

countless

I confess to em barrassm ent
relations,

and

the

who,

for tw enty-five years and

others

when

forbearance

bum ptious academ ic

both

have

I recall

and

although

for them.

my early

generosity

with

prattling

on

industrial

which

Sir

R ichard

innocent o f the rough

and

tum ble

treated

that

of

industrial life, had the audacity to tell the Commission what it should be doing.
me confess too that since then, I have come under Sir Richard's spell;

Let

for what 1

have to say this evening draws on his writings, his decisions and his wisdom
imparted in personal discussion.

How ever, I have extended w hat I have learnt

from him to events and developm ents beyond the
Commission in 1973.

time o f his

retirem ent from the

And he may well disagree with my extrapolation.

therefore not responsible

for what I have to say.

The theme o f my paper is reflected in its title.

I

come to the

conclusion that the

Com m ission like its predecessor, the Conciliation and A rbitration
essentially
rather

than

a fac ilita to r rather than
p ro active,

in

His is

the

a prim e m over o r

form ulation

and

an

Court,

inn o v ato r,

application

of

is

reactive

in dustrial

principles.

This conclusion may not seem obvious from a reading o f tribunal decisions,
particularly the ea rlie r ones, or from
expositions

o f som e

academ ic

m edia com m entaries

w rite rs.1

or indeed

from

the

The impression is easily drawn from

the

announcement o f a new principle or a new approach to wage fixing that, in some
sense, the tribunal is its author or creator.

And credit or blam e is heaped on the

tribunal, usually on its President, as the genius, benign
the parties which

appear before the tribunal.

or

evil, rather than

on

It is assum ed that the tribunal has

a kind of magic wand with the aid of which it can do this or that as it wishes, based
on its own philosophy of what is good, a free agent able to take initiatives against
the tide of forces in the labour market and beyond, an independent variable in
the labour

m arket

equation.

Such a view o f the tribunal's role is misleading.
creates expectations

about

the

function

It is also dangerous because it

and capacity

o f the

arbitration system

which

arc

unrealistic

existence.

and

perhaps

even

inconsistent

with

the

term s

The C om m ission and earlier the Court, have generally

o f its

perform ed

in a

m anner dictated by their charter as set down in the Acts under which they
operate.

Promotion o f the public interest is the key objective o f the Commission

and although

"public

interest"

is not defined,

it is a reasonable

inference

various sections o f the Act that concern for industrial peace and

adverse

economic consequences are the pillars on which this ob jec tiv e rests.
interest

is not

served

by

prescribing

o f principles

and

po lic ie s,

from

The public

how ever

admirable they may seem on paper, which do not work in practice, which arc
flouted or which
unacceptable

do not have

d egree

of

u n rest

general com m unity
or

adverse

support o r which

econom ic

generate

an

c o n seq u e n c e s.

Thus to serve its charter, the Com m ission has to tailor its principles and to apply
them in a way
consequences.
m axim ising

which m inim ises
I choose to

econom ic,

adverse econom ic, industrial

put it negatively

industrial

and

social

and social

rather than positively
benefits

b e cause,

in terms of

realistically,

it is

inherent in conflict resolution processes to m inim ise loss to the parties and to the
comm unity.
arbitration

This is not to say that m ediation processes by conciliation and
do

not lead to constructive

and

positive

d e v e lo p m en ts

in industrial

rela tio n s.

It follows that in order to secure com m unity com m itm ent, the C om m ission must
try to fram e principles which by and large conform
expectations.

to com m unity

values and

It must draw heavily on the material subm itted at hearings and

form a judgem ent on what

system would work best in the circum stances.

changes

approaches

in principles

and

which

have o c c urred

over

the

The

history

of

the Court and the Com m ission have come about m ainly from changes in the
e conom ic,

industrial

and

social

e nvironm ent

personnel and ideas of the tribunal.
the persons who m ake up the tribunal.

rather

than

from

changes

in

the

This is not to underrate the importance of
Their capacity to grasp the issues and to

form correct judgem ent, not on what would be ideal but on what would work best
in the circum stances, has obviously been critical

in the operation o f the system.

In this task, they have acted prim arily not as the originators o f standards and
principles but as the interpreters o f the signs o f the tim es and the facilitators of
an approach

which

would

serve these signs m ost effectively.

In

have been errors o f timing and m agnitude o f adjustm ent in the
principles.

No system can be expected to work perfectly.

decisions has generally

retrospect, there
application of

But the direction of

been to m eet the requirem ents o f the

times.

3

The

Early

History

Let me draw on the records to illustrate the point.
the present

and to assess

From their

early

function

and

decisions.

future

history

have

to

History helps us to understand

prospects.

the present time, tribunals

indicated im plicitly or explicitly,

have reflected on their
the forces

w hich

shape

their

In his "Harvester" judgem ent pursuant to the Excise T a riff Act (1906),

Higgins expressed difficulty

in having to "devise great principles o f action as

between great classes, or to lay down what is fair and reasonable as between
contending

interests", pointing

out that "it

is the function

the Judiciary, to deal with social and economic problems;
apply, and, when
difficulty

sprang

necessary, to
from

seeing

o f the Legislature
it is

for the judiciary to

interpret the enactm ents of the L e g isla tu re ".2

his role

inju dicial

rath e r

than

and

not the interpretation of existing

terms with

his task.

rights.

But he

the creation of
soon came

Earlier, in 1905, his New South Wales counterpart had also raised the issue:
Act "confers very
manner in

His

q u a si-legislative

terms, which is w hat arbitration on interest matters is all about:
new rights,

not

to

the

extensive pow ers, whilst affording alm ost no guidance as to

which those powers

are to be exercised ... as to what

the

the results of the

new method (of settling industrial disputes) are to be the Act is silent".2

In 1918,

some legislative guidance was given on the basic wage but for the most part, the
principles rested

on

the ju d g e m e n t

of the tribunal.

The principles which cam e out o f the early tribunals - basic

wage, com parative

wage justice, wom en's w ages - may seem like bold innovations in wage fixing
made by adventurous tribunals.
substance

to

c o n v e n tio n al

On closer exam ination, they

la b o u r m arket

appear to conform

in

norms.

Consider first the basic wage which Higgins drew out o f his H arvester inquiry
and subsequently applied in settlem ent of wage disputes.

The notion of a 'living

wage" to meet the basic needs o f a family unit was not new.
subject of debate for many years before 1907.

It had been the

Heydon, the President o f the New

South Wales Court of Arbitration had. in 1905, decided that it was the Court's duly
to assist "if possible, so to arrange the business of the country that every worker,
however humble, shall

receive enough to enable him to lead a hum an life, to

marry and bring up a family and maintain them and h im self with, at any rate,
some small degree o f c o m fo rt”.4

Although not articulated in such precise terms,

4

the various anti-sw eating

inquiries

the living standards of workers.
the

Q ueensland

P a rlia m e n t

in the colonies

were

based

on

a concern

about

In 1890, Sir Samuel Griffith introduced a Bill into

g iving

recognition

to

the

p rin c ip le

th at

workers

should be paid a wage adequate to maintain a reasonable standard o f life.

It is not

to stretch the facts unduly to say that one o f the factors behind support for
compulsory

arbitration

was to allow

reasonable standard o f life by

wage earners, especially

rectifying the existing

industrial power in favour o f employers.

the

lopsided

unskilled,

balance

a

of

Deakin in speaking to the Conciliation

and Arbitration Bill in 1903 said that "no m easures ever subm itted by any
legislature offer greater prospects

of the establishm ent o f social ju stic e

removal o f

inequalities than those which are based on the prin c ip le o f

conciliation

and arbitration.

The Bill has been drawn from first to last, looking at

the employer and the em ployee with

strictly

them before the Bar o f the tribunal where ...
evenhanded

ju stice

..."^

and o f the

equal eyes, with

a view to bringing

they shall have m eted out to

them

The absence o f an adequate public finance basis

for

attending to the social welfare needs o f the low income groups m ade the concept
o f a living wage the only viable alternative.

Sum m arising the forces leading
Peter M cCarthy

up to the determ ination o f H iggins' basic

wage,

says:®

"... for more than a decade and a h alf there occurred an unbroken series of
'm o n ste r

d e m o n s tra tio n s ,

gov e rn m e n ts,
arbitration

rallies

of

he a rin g s,

protest
the

unem ployed,

expose's

oriented

parliam entary

eliciting

sy m p ath y

B u l l e t i n , concluded:

by

debates

for

'the

m ee tin g s,

w e ll-p u b lic is e d
'rev e la tio n s'

at

d e p u ta tio n s
industrial

the

A n ti-S w eatin g

League,

- the

whole draw in g

a ttention

unskilled

labourer'.

to

social
to

welfare

and

U n d e rs ta n d a b ly ,

the

'The public ... has had "living wage" so much drummed

into its ear that it has come to regard a bare living

'living wage' as the

proper wage for the w orking man to get".

M oreover,
too.

the living wage

concept had

Pope Leo xiii's encyclical, R erum

adictate o f nature m ore im perious
man

and man,

in reasonable

that the

and

frugal

c o m fo rt" .7

c anvassed

in o th er countries

N o v a r u m . proclaim ed in 1891 that "there is

and m ore

rem uneration

known throughout the world

been w idely

must

ancient than
be enough

to

any

support

This pronouncem ent w ould

at least by those concerned

and although not acknow ledged as an influence

bargain

with

the

between
w age-carncr

have been
the

labour market,

in their ju d g e m e n ts , there

is a
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familiar ring

in the

words

used

defining the living or basic

by

Australian

tribunals,

including

Higgins,

in

wage.

It was not only the living wage concept which was widely accepted as proper;
there was reality also in the figure chosen by Higgins.

In fixing 7/- as the daily

wage which was "fair and reasonable" for a family unit, Higgins was guided by
evidence based on a rough budget survey and by what public utilities were
paying.

But as McCarthy has shown, for many years before 1907, the

appropriateness o f this figure had been the subject o f intense advocacy.

"Most

noticeable is the constant harping o f the need to raise and to standardize 7
shillings a day as the 'living w age’ for unskilled labourers.
enthusiasm,

labour

debated public

m em b e rs,

servants'

on

the

first

salaries, pressed

occasion

And with no less

C o m m o n w e a lth

for and secured

parliam ent

a m inim um

living wage

of 42 shillings for a six day week for all male, adult, governm ent em ployees".8

Finally, the imm ediate context in which Higgins fixed the basic wage was
significant.

The concept underlying the Excise T ariff Act had been an issue of

public debate, at least in Victoria, for some years before Federation in the form of
the "New Protection" policy
benefits

of

In all the

in which wage earners were expected to share in the

protection.

circumstances,

it would have been very surprising if Higgins had not

decided as he did. True, there were overtones of defiance o f

supply and demand

in

some of his decisions after 1907 and in the claim that the basic wage was
"sacrosanct" and "beyond the

reach o f

bargaining".

market forces would be to put it too harshly.
the unskilled wage was in certain areas;
before O'Connor for unskilled
between 6/6 and 7/6.

But to say that he overlooked

He did after all take notice o f what

and settlem ents by consent in 1906

labourers (for exam ple,

in B agshaw 's

case)9 varied

Further, he m ade it clear in his first basic wage a w ard1 0

that "I should like it to be understood that I have never laid down that the
capabilities of an industry are not to be taken into consideration".
the circumstances

are very exceptional,

pay at the same rate as his richer rival.

the needy

em p lo y e r

should

Also, "unless
be required

The rem uneration o f the employee

cannot be allowed to depend

on the profits made by the individual employer;

the profits of the industry as

a whole may be taken into acco u n t".11

in line with the neo-classical

case for an efficient allocation o f labour in a

competitive labour market.
employers

higher

than

This is

but
surely

If he had fixed an unskilled w age for certain

one which

m ight

to

have

resulted

from "higgling

o f the

6

m arket",

it was because

bargaining
worker.

as an

he

unequal

regarded

co n te st

the higgling

between

the

process,

e m p lo y e r

A fair conclusion is that he adopted and

under

and

individual

the

individual

facilitated the extension o f

he perceived as a com m unity standard rather than that he created one.

what

It should

also be noted that the H arvester wage took some years to flow generally and that
in that time prices were rising.

His justification for extending the Harvester standard to others w as that it was a
"danger to industrial

peace

receiving different pay.

when

workm en

perform ing

the

sam e

work"

are

Kelly put it aptly when he said in 1942:

"The Court has regarded itself, I think properly, as the interpreter, not the
censor, o f the social conscience.

Thus, when in its determ inations it gave

effect

to the concept

o f the basic

wage, it was giving effect to a concept

which

originated not

in its own

mind in the H arvester case or elsewhere,

nor in the precedent legislation

but

in the social

expressed itself in the latter half o f the century
when

the

evils

o f poverty

and

inefficiency

application o f the doctrines o f laissez

W hen Powers aw arded

c o n scie n ce

which

and the beginning o f this

a ttending

the

u nbridled

faire becam e so m a n if e s t" .1 2

autom atic quarterly cost o f living a d justm ents to the basic

wage in 1922, he took his cue from what was becoming a grow ing practice 13.
Autom atic

adjustm ents had

o f awards, falling prices in
employers.
generally

already
1921

spread by consent

ag re e m e n t

presum ably making such a practice

in a num ber
attractive to

The Court m erely extended and refined the practice to awards
as being consistent with the basic

The determ ination

wage idea.

o f m argins o r relative w ages provides

influence of the norm s and practices
adopted by the tribunal.
coined

and

and popularised

of the labour m arket on

The term "com parative wage justice"
by

Australian

tribunals but

in B ritain by

no less an

o f the

the principles
may have been

the concept

goes back to much earlier times in many countries.
respectability

an o th er exam ple

and

its

application

It was given academic

authority than A lfred M arshall.

Using the

term "fair w ages” instead o f com parative wage justice, he defined such a wage as
being "about on a level o f average payment for tasks in o ther trades which are of
equal

d ifficulty

abilities
wage

and

and

d isa g re e a b le n e s s ,

an equally

structure

expensive

sim ilar to that

w hich

tra in in g " .14

which

require

e q u a lly

rare

natural

Its application would produce a

results from

a freely o p e ra tin g com petitive

7

labour market,

reflecting the

relative supply prices o f labour o f various kinds.

is also the basis of job evaluation systems.

It

Mr Justice Kelly put the generally

accepted m eaning o f com parative wage justice in the following way as far back as
1942:

The task o f the Court in the settlem ent by arbitration o f disputes regarding
wages is that o f ascertaining what in all the circum stances can be said for
fair paym ent for the p a rticu la r work in question.

T he ju stic e of awarding

any particular rate depends on whether it answers this test o f fairness.
fairness is a relative concept.
standard.

But

It means consistency with some accepted

And it is not for the Court to create standards.

The function of

the Court is simply to recognize such accepted standards as are not shown to
it to be unjust, extravagant or inadequate.
Court from its inception has allowed
'fair' wages by the e vidence
labour have

found

It is for these reasons, that the

itself to be guided in its assessment of

of what

it desirable to pay

reasonable em ployers

o f competent

and w hat com petent

workm en have

been willing to accept for any particular class o f work.
in fact, provided the

only practicable starting point from

approach the w a ge-fixing problem .
has always been prepared

Such evidence has,
which to

To supplem ent it, how ever, the Court

to admit proof of any circum stances

tend to show that, because o f the economic

which may

situation in which either the

employers or the em ployees, or both, find them selves, the adoption and
perpetuation o f previously current w age rates on levels w ould

in fact be

u n fa ir.1 5

The

words "it is not for the Court to create

standards" are w orth emphasising.

The

reduction in standard hours o f work from

48 to 44 for many awards in the

federal jurisdiction was p receded by State legislation in Q ueensland
South Wales providing for such reduction.

Again, the

and New

federal 40-h o u r

week

standard awarded in 1948 was preceded by New South W ales legislation.
recently, the 38-hour week

was conceded

industry in 1981 from which

It

by collective

More

ba rg a in in g in the metal

it flowed generally.

is in connection with the determ ination o f women's wages that the

endorsement o f conventional

standards by

articulated the principle as early
with slight modifications until

as

1972.

tribunals

is m ost clearly

seen.

1912 and it rem ained substantially
The basis of

the principle was

Higgins

in force

to distinguish

8

work

which had been done m ainly by males

by females.

from

work

traditionally

done mainly

In male work, wom en workers who may be said to be in competition

with male workers, would have to be paid the full male rate.

In effect, in these

circum stances, equal pay for equal work would apply but only to protect the male
worker,

the

"typical

breadw inner",

from being

undercut

by

fem ale

workers.

In

female work, the basic wage com ponent was to be a fraction o f the male basic
wage, sufficient to meet the "normal needs o f a single w om an supporting herself
by her own exertions" and not the normal needs of a family unit o f five.
m argins

for skill,

female m argins

and related to market rates.
the segm ented

were to be based on relative

w ork

As for
requirem ents

C om parative wage justice w ould apply only within

female labour market,

and not across the w hole

labour m arket.

This principle was no m ore than a rationalised ratification o f the social values
and standards o f the times.
conditions

which

were

But it was also consistent with supply and demand

in part

o f w om en in the workforce.

determ ined

by conventional

a ttitudes

on

the place

As these changed and areas o f work hitherto closed

to w om en were opened up, so women's wages rose relatively in the m arket place,
and aw ards followed suit.

T he course o f women's wages in A ustralia followed that

of m any other countries and for sim ilar reasons.

By the 1950's, the female basic

wage had risen from 56% to 75% of the male basic wage;

female margins in many

industries had m oved to equality, or close to it, with m ale m argins.
Higgins principle remained in place.

But the

In the 1949-50 Basic W age Case, Mr. Justice

Foster, a man not tied to orthodoxy, said;1^

(a)

the male basic wage was a social wage for a man, his wife and family .....

(b)

equal pay based on the male basic wage would put an intolerable strain
on

(c)

the

econom y;

it was socially preferable to provide a higher wage for the male because
o f his social obligations to financee, wife as family;

(d)

whilst single females were said to be anxious to receive the higher wage
their interest changed on their m arriage ...
b ecam e
po ssib le

concerned
pay

that

their husbands

should

As m arried
bring

wom en they

hom e

the

largest

envelope.

The C o m m issio n ’s 1969 Equal Pay decision followed in substance the provisions
m ade a few years earlier under various State laws enlarging the scope for equal
pay, but it was not until

1972 that the Higgins principle was form ally abandoned.

By introducing the principle o f equal pay for equal v a lu e , the way was opened

9

for the extension o f com parative wage justice across gender lines.
rationale of the C om m ission's decision
climate.

was the changed

social

The stated

and industrial

It said:17

As to equal pay, the broad issue we have to decide is w hether in the present
social and industrial clim ate it is fair and reasonable that the 1969
principles should

rem ain

unaltered.

This

involves us in m aking an

assessment o f what, if anything, has happened in the area o f equal pay
since 1969 which w ould m ake it just and proper for us to alter those
p rin c ip le s.

We think that

broad

These changes

are

changes o f significance

reflected

have occurred

since 1969.

in the attitudes o f governm ents in Australia

and in developm ents in the United K ingdom , New Z ealand and elsewhere.

All these changes require us to reconsider the
at them in the light o f present circumstances.
consideration

to m erely

am ending

those

1969 principles and to look
We have given

principles but

is better for us to state positively a new principle.

we

consider that

it

In our view the concept

of 'equal pay for equal work' is too narrow in today's world and we think
the time has come to enlarge the concept to 'equal pay for work of equal
value'.

This m eans that award rates for all work should be considered

without regard to the sex o f the employee.

In 1974, the Com m ission extended the (adult m ale)
females, describing it
At

national m inim um wage to

as a "logical extension o f the equal pay principles" of 1972.

the same time, it form ally abandoned the notional family wage aspect of the

national minimum wage (which had replaced the basic wage in
difficulty of "doing adequate ju stice to the widely

1966), noting the

varying family obligations of

workers on the m inim um wage", and rem inding the parties that it was "an
industrial

arbitration

tribunal,

not a social

w elfare

a g e n c y ." 1^

The break with

the Higgins period was now formally recognised so far as the lowest wage of the
"humblest class o f w orkers"

was concerned.

The Postwar E xperience

Q u a si-C ollective

with

The postwar social, industrial

B argaining

and economic clim ate had changed not only for

women's wages but also for the kind of wage fixing approach which was tenable.

10
In the

early

po stw a r years,

the

tribunal

the clim ate o f the labour m arket.
time gone beyond
wage;

lagged

som ew hat

behind

the change

in

It understood that the basic wage had for some

its original concept of being kind o f national social

minimum

because the basic wage was also a substantial com ponent o f m ost wages and

salaries,

its m ovem ent constituted a m ovem ent in the general level o f wages.

A lthough

u nintended

by

its

founders,

an evolutionary

process

had

hands o f the tribunal, w illy nilly, an instrument as powerful
ram ifications

as budgetary

and m onetary policy.

placed

in the

in its economic

This becam e c lear during the

Great D epression o f the 1930's when the Court ordered a 10% reduction in real
wages;

and o f course, also during World W ar II, when wage restraint under

National Security R egulations was the basis o f its policy.

H ow ever, the

tribunal

did not adjust quickly enough to the postw ar developments.

The era o f high unem ploym ent, characteristic o f the years before W orld W ar II,
was over.
e n sured

In that period, high unemployment and the overall

that

by p ressure

the

p resc rip tio n s

for ovcraw ard

o f arbitrators

payments.

were

generally

weakness o f unions

not

much

exceeded

The circum stances o f the postw ar period -

the high noon o f K eynesian econom ics - were som ew hat different - low
u n e m p lo y m e n t,
unions,

and

rapid

e c o n o m ic

grow th,

in flationary

te n d e n c ie s ,

go v e rn m e n ts com m itted to full em ploym ent policy.

some difficulty sorting out their role in this environm ent.

well

established

Tribunals had

Kelly, the Chief Judge

o f the C om m onw ealth Court at the time, seemed to regard the control o f inflation
as the Court's prim ary task.
increase

d espite

e vidence

In the 1949-50 Basic W age Case, in rejecting any wage

o f substantial

economic

prosperity,

he

said

that the

Court's duty was "to give a lead to the other instruments of adjustment by taking a
firm stand to stabilise, as well as lies in its power, the level o f wages ...

However

limited its pow er may be to 'stop the rot', that power should be exercised."1 ^

His m inority view in that case, did not prevail but he persisted in this approach.
His stand may well have influenced Chief C om m issioner Galvin to reject in 1952
any

in cre ase

in m argins

b ecause

of the

inflationary

a sharp contraction in differentials for skill.

situation,

despite

evidence

of

Late in 1951, Kelly took the

initiative to call a conference o f employers and unions and to make suggestions
involving

the stabilisation o f the basic wage, m argins, prices and hours o f work.

This was followed early in the following year by a letter to the parties setting out
a fourte en -p o in t plan

which

tariffs and m onetary policy.
su rp risin g ly .

went beyond wages

and hours to taxation, subsidies,

The plan was rejected by the parties, not

This case provides a lesson on the very narrow limits to which the tribunal can
act as

a prime mover;

Calling a conference
detail,

although, to be fair, Kelly's aim was a voluntary compact.
is unexceptionable.

M aking

specific

suggestions

particularly on general econom ic policy, is another.

not lost on

later tribunals.

in such

A nd the lesson

was

H ow ever, it is surprising that Kelly as Presiding

Judge

could have been associated so soon after with the follow ing expression of the
Court's function contained in the 1952/53 Basic W age Standard Hours Case:

"The Arbitration Court is neither a social and econom ic legislature.

Its

function under ... the Act is to prevent or settle specific industrial disputes
... the powers conferred upon it by that section are in respect of subjects
which

by

th eir

very

na tu re attract

c o n s id e ra tio n s

The exercise o f these powers consequently
economic results;

of

has

g eneral

significance

w idespread social

and

but it is not the function of the Court to aim at such social

and economic changes as may

seem to be

desirable to the members of the

trib u n a l.

The function o f the Court must be exercised in the

social and economic

setting of the time at which it makes its decision."

These words could have been uttered by H iggins20 but they do not describe the
approach taken by Kelly in 1950-53.
which abandoned

Further, the words sit uneasily in a decision

autom atic cost o f living

adjustm ents and

influenced by Kelly's great

worry about inflation.

industrial and social setting

o f the time.

was strongly

But it m isread the economic,

Not only had inflation

petered out

by the

middle of 1953, but to apply wage restraint under conditions o f full employment
simply by the decree o f the tribunal was untenable.
sustain it.

T he labour market would not

The Court was divided on this issue and the circum stances which

resulted in the decision

having

the

appearance o f unanim ity are discussed by

Blanche d’Alpuget in her biography

o f Sir Richard K irb y .2 1

The abandonment o f cost o f living

adjustm ents provided

generally to go outside the
were being driven
meal

by

quasi-collective

by way of

system

ov e ra w ard
barg a in in g ,

the

im petus for

for improvements as a m atter o f policy.
paym ents
the

through s h o p flo o r

tribunal

b e in g

draw n

action
into

set the

standard

for

arbitrated

aw ards

W ages

and p ie c e 

these

conciliation and to ratify agreements and consent awards.

settlements increasingly

unions

processes

These

in those

areas

12
where unions were weak and in pans of the public sector.
arbitrated
with

decisions

collective

o f tribunals had a ad

bargaining;

and,

us the worst o f both worlds.
probably

later,

in the new

adjustm ents had

been

Court in 1956,
it.

o f the ju d ic ia ry ,
c o m m issioners

in

in she

C om m ission

p ro d u cin g

w ithin
through

im portant

cha n g es

by

argue

econom ic environm ent,

Sir R ichard

forum

Im pressed

as I will

was

the

the

even

gave

if cost o f living

arbitral

Kirby, apart from discarding

g re a te r ccmity
and

industrial relations
app ro a c h e s

p ressure

shared

1953 decision.

which took over the

C om m ission

in

being

presently, their inter-action

functions o f the

quickly becam e aware of the new environm ent and

Its President,

public

over wage m ovem ents

O f course, such a situation may have developed,

m ain ta in e d

The newly established

The dom inance, which

for real

and cooperation
involving

and

-age

the sartorial trappings
be tw e en ju d g es

h im s e lf m ore

other societies,

and principles

adjusted itself to

until

m aintenance

led

his

and

The CPI was to becom e a

dom inant

adjustm ents, and later total

wage adjusiments.

actively

the

in the

Com m ission

retire m e n t in

im provem ent

labour m arket, the C om m ission partly relented from its stand in the

and

1973.

in the

1952-53 Case.

- semi-automatic - factor in annual

basic

The developm ent o f the total wage

the m erging into one o f the basic wage and m argin - had com e about because, in
effect,

the ad ju stm e n t

round.

T he

rapid

o f m etal trades m argins had

tra nsm ission

becom e

an o th er national

o f this adjustm ent to m argins

established the logic o f national adjustment o f the total wage.
frequency

and regularity

o f national

wage adjustm ents

now

wage

generally
The greater

to be

an annual

event - reflected recognition o f the temper o f the labour m arket in a full
em p lo y m en t

econom y.

The

e c o n o m ic

changed

and

industrial e nvironm ent

also

nec essita te d

the approach o f

the Com m ission if it was to serve its charter.

b a rg aining

s e ttle m e n ts

type

arbitration could

work.

becam e increasingly

a change

Collective

c o m m o n and affected

In the words ef the Com m ission in the

in

the

1970 Oil

way

Industry

case, "parties may be o f the view that if conciliation fails, any subsequent
arbitration

w ould be more

the position
e x te n sio n

of

o f negotiators
the

realistic if the arbitrators are able to put them selves in
and

L o regard arbitration

n e g o tia tio n s."^

o f the basis o f the C om m ission's
disputes

in

the

fo llow ing

term s:

as a prologation

or

Sir Richard Kirby has given a succinct account
approach in dealing with non-national wage

wag
-

1 3

Ihcrc will be a better understanding o f the workings o f the
Com m onwealth

conciliation

and arbitration

system

Commission as a key-stone of our industrial

if we

relations

look

at the

system , rather than as

a legal institution or as an economic policy m aker ...

T he industrial

relationship

levels

particular

... is an

workers

e ver-continuing one

and

em ployers

organization is national.
end their relationship

at the low er

disagree

and

also

at

where

h ig h e r

levels

where

The settlem ent o f one p a rticu lar dispute does not

there and then.

Not only m ust they continue to

work to m aintain the productive process, but it is inevitable that there will
be further disagreem ents, at any rate about other issues from time to time.
Each particular solution may not be the solution sought by both or either of
the parties but at least it must, in the ultimate, becom e acceptable to both.
Without this

m utual

acceptance

the

econom ic

co-o p e ra tio n

which

is

essential in the production o f goods and services for the com m unity will
break down. ... The imposition of a settlement, to which one or both of the
parties is strongly opposed may, in fact, result in a deterioration of the
situation.

Sim ilarly,

if the

constant or n e ar-constant im p ression

that a party must be rapped over the knuckles for m istaken
even

m isbehaviour,

Again, even

the

efficiency

though the word

o f the

"expediency"

system

m ust

has or m ay

is given

thinking or

inevitably

suffer.

have certain

undesirable undertones, it may well be that in particular situations it is an
expedient

solution

which

This is clearly a departure

from

m ust

be

re a c h e d .22

the Higgins approach which

prevailed

until the

early 1950's.

The "judicial" approach o f that period called for the determination of

issues in the

light of evidence and argument, and on the basis o f

in accordance with

the dictates o f the strong.

opportunist and never yield to force.
the force of might".
force.

The tribunal should

principles, not
not be

It should "assert the rule o f right as against

It will not purchase peace by com prom ising the methods of

And so on.24But tim es had changed.

The balance o f industrial and market

power had moved strongly in the unions' favour.
arbitration would not work.

Higgins "judicial" style

The Com m ission had to adapt to its new environment,

to find a new style and new principles to serve the objects o f the Act under which
it operated.

To have pursued prim arily

circumstances would not only have
economic loss from
arbitration

dom inated

industrial
by

objective

failed but w ould have

a c tion.25

qua si-c o llec tiv e

had for many areas in effect

an anti-inflation

in the

resulted

in substantial

And so a new style o f "accommodative"
bargaining

took

its

place.

become a m ediation process op e ra tin g

Arbitration
by pursuasion

14

rather than com pulsion.
not
by

being

e xercised,

c o lle ctiv e

There

was

In those areas where union pow er was still weak or was

the

b a rg a in in g ,

nothing

w rong

Higgins

approach

continued

in this

to

then things started to go wrong.
- national

w age, piece-m eal

overaw ard

p a ym ents

- the

provided

established

industrial

action

and

wage

Until the late 60's, this was the case.

amount

industry

at each

or award

level

adjustm ents,

progressively

in an econom ically and industrially destructive way.
a valiant

standards

But

A three-tiered system o f wage increases began to

develop

m ade

the

apply.

approach

inflation were held at acceptable levels.

o f e xtending

and

boosting

the others

In 1969, the Com m ission

attem pt to limit increases beyond the

"econom ic"

increases granted

in the national wage cases by stating the principles on which such other
increases should
the overall
p r ic e s

be

increases

aw arded.
in wages

But the three-tiered
rising yearly

system

to explosive

pushed

on relentlessly,

d im ensions

and

lifting

a c c o r d in g l y .

I do not mean to imply that the wage fixing processes were the main villains of
the piece.
and

any

Fiscal and monetary policies in the period aided and abetted wage rises,
a ttem p t to apply

sustainable.

W age policy

instrum ent o f w age
econom ists

greater restraint through

awards

would

not have

been

cannot be expected to work single-handedly as an

restraint.

The Com m ission understood this even if many

did not.

By 1974, the tim e had com e for the Com m ission to seriously consider whether
national wage adjustm ents had a place any longer in the system.
increases

at industry

through the system

and

individual

award

level,

largely

Sectional wage

by co n sen t

were

flowing

and building up such a large general wage increase that a

national wage increase would surely add fuel to what already was an explosive
trend.

The C om m ission posed this prospect seriously to the parties in the 1974

N ational

W hat

W age

decision.

e m e rg e d

from

the

decen tralised

q u a si-c o lle c tiv e

b a rg a in in g

approach

the 1960's and early 1970's was that it proved to be highly inflationary.
desired
the

such

No party

an o u tcom e, but the absence o f a self-regulating m echanism

labour m arket which

a se lf-d estru ctiv e

process

would

avoid excessive wage

as each group, quite

interest. W hat w as needed in the circum stances

and price

rationally, pursued

of

within

increases created
its own

was an m echanism

which

was
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able to take a macro view o f sectional wage increases and avoid economic damage
from excessive

Experiments

overall

with

w age

increase.

Incom es

Policy

It was in this context that the highly centralised
was introduced by the Com m ission in
phase of the history o f the

1975.

and structured

indexation system

It is important to dwell a little

system; for it provides a telling

Commission as a facilitator. The case for

this

illustration of the

wage indexation was argued

by the unions and the Com m onw ealth Government.

on

principally

But they c onceded that it

would have to be part o f a package of principles to ensure restraint on wage
increase eminating from
that wage

indexation

sources

w ould

other than the national wage.

m o derate

inflation

inflationary expectations from wage claims;

by

rem o v in g

It was argued
se lf-fu lfillin g

that it was a fair basis for national

wage adjustment; and that it w ould reduce industrial disputes.

T h e employers and

some of the States which opposed it contended that indexation w ould merely add
another tier to the

system

with

even

m ore

serious

in flationary

consequences.

I shall not dwell on the details o f the package introduced by the Commission.
These are adequately covered

in the literature.26

basis on which the new approach was taken:

What I wish to emphasis is the

it was that any increases in wages

outside national wage

would be negligible overall and would be processed by

appropriate principles

in an orderly

second and third tier

fashion.

A recurrence o f

the

uncontrolled

increases o f the m agnitude which had o c c u rre d

destroy the prospects for indexation.

would

The assurance o f the A C TU on this

assumption of the package was a material factor in the C om m ission's decision to
accede to indexation.

But the Com m ission had no illusions about the fragility of

the system and it warned that "violation even by a small section o f industry,
whether in the award or non-aw ard area would put at risk the future of
indexation for a ll".27

Long before the Accord, the C om m ission was effectively being asked to embark on
a quasi-incomes policy but with charge only of federal aw ard pay.
called for "supporting

m echanism s"

matters which were outside

from

go v e rn m e n ts

the Com m ission's control

on wage claims - prices, governm ent charges and
which would assist in wage

restraint.

to

e n su re

but had

It therefore
that

those

an important effect

taxation - were handled in

ways

16

W hile acknow ledging that a stand-still on wages for the present would be the most
salutory policy for the econom y, the Commission did not believe that such a
course was realistic and sustainable.

It concluded that on balance

... some form o f wage indexation would contribute to a more rational system
o f wage fixation, to m ore orderly, m ore equitable and less inflationary
wage increases and to better industrial relations, p r o v i d e d
was part
and

o f a p ackage

the

necessary

conclusion
in

w hich

'su p p o rtin g

included

appropriate

m echanism s'

wage

to ensure

that

fixing principles

their viability.

is not inconsistent with much o f the evidence

o pposition

and

This

argument put

to in d e x a tio n .2 8

Thus the C om m ission em barked on a new course based essentially
the conditions

indexation

and ex p e cta tio n s

appeared before it.

expressed

by substantial elem ents

M oreover, it was tentative and cautious.

and largely on
o f those who

It laid down the

principles and said that "the next few m onths will provide the opportunity
viability o f these conditions to be tested".
operate

in an institutional vacuum

Further:

for the

"The C om m ission does not

and the outcom e and the future o f indexation

will, therefore, depend not only on the Commission's decisions but also on the
extent

to

which

unions, e m ployers, the Australian

and

State G overnm ents

and

ultim ately

the public at large are prepared to lend their weight to the conditions

necessary

for the

The

enth u sia stic

success

o f in d exation".2 9

acceptance

o f the conditions

evident three m onths later.
centralised

system .

by nearly

all

participants

were

It was a firm endorsem ent to continue with the

Inflation

slow ed down and industrial disputes

fell.

R efinem ents were m ade to som e o f the principles in the light o f experience and
in due course, less than full indexation became necessary because o f the state of
the economy.
began to
becam e

The new regime seemed to be working well for two years.

break down. The conditions
p ro g re s s iv e ly

c o m m itm en t

to

the

c o m p ro m is e d

as

o f consen su s

on the

side

w ith o u t

w ants

and

go v e rn m e n ts

lost

in dexation

in d exatio n " .

30

was ready toabandon the system.

requirem ents o f the

years had gradually evaporated.
one

parties

its successful operation
their

system .

By the middle o f 1979, the Com m ission
degree

necessary for

Then it

system

which

The high

prevailed in earlier

"It appears", the C om m ission summ ed up, "that

w ith o u t

restraints w hile

the

o ther

w ants

restraints

W hile believing that the existing system offered the
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potential for industrial

and econom ic stability, this potential

without substantial com m itm ent to its requirem ents.

could

A passage,

not

be

which

realised

was

repeated by the C om m ission a num ber of times in later years, expresses in
substance the theme o f this paper:

"The C om m ission has no vested interest in

indexation or any other system o f wage fixation.

In accordance with its statutory

obligations, it seeks to apply that system which provides a viable balance between
industrial

and

eco n o m ic

c o n s id e ra tio n s " .^ 1

The Commission called a conference to consider the future o f the system.
reported later that there
continue";

was

"a universal desire that a centralized

It

system

should

and that despite an absence o f consensus on the structure and

principle of the system ,
between the main

"there

had

been

a significant n a rro w in g

o f differences

p a rtie s " .2 2

And so, in retrospect m istakenly, the system was kept alive until

the middle of

1981 when

the degree of

it became clear beyond doubt to the Com m ission that

sectional flexibility being dem anded by the parties could not be sustained by a
centralised system

based

on

indexation.

wage adjustments were abandoned.
system of wage determination.

Indexation,

and by

im plication, national

It was to be an aw ard-by-aw ard, decentralised

The labour market, under the euphoria o f a

supposed minerals boom, reverted to collective bargaining
scale reminiscent of the years im m ediately
and

in the style and on the

before indexation.

Agreement

on wage increases

a 38-hour week,

labour cost

of around 25%, became the standard for a flow-on.

The

representing
A

Metal

Industry

an increase

in

call by the ACTU

early in 1982 for a conference to consider return to a centralised system based on
indexation was refused by the Com m ission in the face o f opposition from the
employers

and

the

C o m m o n w e a lth

G overnm ent,

both

p re fe rrin g

the

approach to continue "unaided and unfettered" by the Com m ission.

The

preference for a more deregulated

labour m arket was c lear in the

Commonwealth's submission.

C om m ission expressed

T he

down the path of decentralisation

w illingness

and sought subm issions

from

c a se-by-case

to move

the

Commonwealth and others on the details o f such a process.

However, the mood for deregulation lapsed in the light of the wage explosion
which emanated from such a system and the onset o f a serious economic
recession.

In D ecem ber 1982, the Com m ission convened at the request o f the

Commonwealth G overnm ent

supported

by

the

State

G o v e rn m e n t

seeking a wage pause, in effect, a return to a centralised system.

and

em ployers

The unions did
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not put up a strong case against a pause, and in all the circum stances, subject to
m inor exceptions,

the C om m ission

prescribed

guidelines for the pause

for a period

of 6 m onths, following which the m atter would be reviewed.

A Federal election three m onths later brought a change o f G overnm ent.

The new

G overnm ent was bound by an A ccord with the trade union m ovem ent and
com m itted to an incom es policy.

The Com m onwealth described its incomes and

prices policy, a concept endorsed by the National Econom ic Sum m it,
"corner-stone” o f its econom ic strategy.
to a " n o -e x tra -cla im s” provision

as the

The ACTU expressed a firm commitment

within an indexation package.

Further, the CPI

was expected to be deflated by between 2 % and 3% by the introduction of
M edicare.
ea rlie r

T hese were circum stances which m ade a return to som ething like the

indexation

p a ckage,

industrially

and

econom ically,

a m ore

viable

p ro p o sitio n .

Support for a structured c e n tralise d

system

em p lo y e rs,

price m ovem ents

a lthough

consideration

co n c ed in g that

in national wage

indexation

in the package.

"profound

change

was well-nigh universal.
were

a

But the

relevant

cases, were opposed to the inclusion of prima facie

H ow ever, the Commission was im pressed with the

in the context in which a centralized system

w ould operate"

and it agreed o perate such a system , setting out more explicitly than ever before
the conditions for it to work effectively

and concluding:

It will be c le a r that the conditions stated above as being necessary for full
indexation to be viable,
m in im isatio n

o f labour

the

app lic atio n

and

the

pric e s

of

e x is te n c e

and

cost

the
of

n o n -w a g e

industrially and econom ically, go to the
increases

P rin c ip le s
su p porting
in co m e s,

taxation especially those

outside

generally,
m echanism s

restraint

on

national

the

w age, consistency in

h o n o u rin g

w hich

e n su re

g o v e rn m e n t

of

undertakings

restraint

c harges

which feed into the CPI, and attention to

on

and
the social

w a g e .^ 3

The parties had to be rem inded o f the lessons learnt from the failure o f the first
in d e x a tio n

period!

For about two years the new system worked reasonably well.
of paym ents crisis developed:
of trade

sharply

against

But then a balance

the collapse in com m odity prices turned the terms

A ustralia,

the

floating

e xchange

rate

depreciated
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substantially,

and the

international debt rose to an alarm ingly high

basis of the Accord - m aintaining
sustained in this
unemployment.

econom ic

without

a very

large

increasing

e xports

and reducing

im ports.

Such

especially

o f m anufactured

restru c tu rin g

called

for

goods

in cre ase d

competitiveness which could be achieved without too drastic
if

p ro d u ctiv ity

increase

in

could only be overcom e by a m ajo r restructuring of

the economy,

standards

The

real wages and in time raising it - could not be

environm ent

The problem

level.

in c re a se d

The importance o f productivity

and

services

international

a fall in living

sufficiently.

grow th

was

peak union and em ployer organisations.

appreciated

by

the

G ov e rn m e n t,

and

This was reflected in jo in t

pronouncements on the su b je c t,34 by the ACTU/TD C Report, A u s t r a l i a
R e c o n s tr u c te d
and culture",

which called

for the developm ent o f a productivity

and by various actions taken by the C om m onw ealth G overnm ent to

promote productivity

in various

flexibility - especially

industries.

flexibility

The need

for g rea ter labour market

in work and m anagem ent practices

productivity growth, was an issue which was com m anding the
number of other c ountries.33
which there

"consciousness

had

been

interest also of a

The issue went well beyond the m atter o f wages, on

a d isp ro p o rtio n a te

especially from econom ists

- for

con c en tra tio n

innocent o f the operation

for

g r e a te r

flexibility,

o f the lab o u r m arket

and

critical of what was seen as undue rigidity in relative wages operating under the
centralised system.

Experience in the 1960's and early 70's and again in 1981/82,

showed that allowing greater relative wage flexibility to operate
unstructured system, did

not

in practice

achieve

grea ter

relative

Rather, the generalising effect o f flow-on defeated the object
produced an

excessive

overall

in an
w age

and

flexibility.

instead

wage m ovem ent.

It was in the context of the serious developments in the econom y and consensus
on the need for greater productivity

that the C om m ission heard

an

application

in

1987 by the Confederation o f A ustralian Industry for a tw o-tiered wage system:
the first tier being the uniform national

wage increase and the second tier being

subject to a number o f principles to be applied on an award by award basis.

The

second tier would include a principle which would allow a wage increase
contingent on changes

in

work

and

m anagem ent

p ra c tic e s ,

m u lti-s k illin g ,

flexible time patterns o f work and other such elem ents which w ould
increase in productivity.

The concept was generally

governments and accordingly

the

Com m ission

supported by

in substance

a dopted

result in

the parties and
it.
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Once again, it is important to note that initialise for the new system came from
the parties which have to live with it.
also been

The notion o f a "second tier" had of course

a feature o f the e a rlie r indexation packages:

wage increase for all

sim ultaneous

awards and specific adjustments on an individual

basis depending on the p a rticu la r principles being availed of.
about this second

national
award

W hat was novel

tier^6 w as that it was subject to an upper limit increase of 4%

and that it changed the balance in the amount of pay increase from being
predominantly - well over 90% - in the first tier to around 50%.
potential

wage increase

w ould

apply

Thus, half of the

to individual aw ards at different times,

depending on the ability o f the parties to the award to satisfy the conditions o f
one or more o f the second tier principles.
adjustm ents
work

and

was

intended

m anagem ent

Efficiency Principle.

to

draw

prac tic e s

This m argin o f flexibility in wage

out improved p roductivity
as a requirem ent

through

changes

o f the R e stru c tu rin g

This Principle and its successor in the A ugust

in

and

1988

rely on negotiations betw een the parties to achieve productivity

decision^7

im provem ents

but

they

differed

from

determ ination

in that they

perm issable.

T his was intended to ensure that the degree o f flexibility allowed in

im pose

e a rlie r

attempts

to

dec en tra lise

an upper limit on the wage

the system did not get out o f hand as it did in earlier times.
d iffe re d

from

the

a w a rd -b y -a w a rd

G overnm ent and e m ployers in
ba rg a in in g -o rie n te d

system .

a rrangem ent

favoured

wage

increase

This approach also
by

the

C om m onw ealth

1981/82 as part of a m ore decentralised collective

It provided

scope for a grea ter

while m aintaining control over the m acro wages outcom e.

w orkplace

focus

Such control was now

possible only because flexibility was not at large but was within the constraints of
a structured

and

regulated

centralised system

based on consensus

and indeed, in substance, on the submissions of the parties.
which

fuelled

the

m achinery

provided

by

to form ulate the rules and to apply them.
condition for the system to work.

the Com m ission

o f the parties

It was this consensus
and

the

State tribunals

The tribunals are thus a necessary

But they are not a sufficient condition.

They

also need the broad consensus and com m itm ent of the parties to the rules of the
gam e.

C o n c lu d in g

O b s e r v a tio n s

Let me now draw the threads together.

We have com e a long
founders.

way from the arbitration system as perceived by its

W hat was seen as constituting an adjunct o f collective bargaining, has

2 1
become an adjunct of national economic policy.

W hat was conceived as a fish has

evolved into a fowl!

Higgins and his successors up to the outbreak of W orld W ar II, saw as one of the
objects of the system, the protection of the living standard of wage earners at the
lower end of the wage scale.

Higgins' dream o f "a new province for law and

order" if men "secured the essentials of food, shelter, clothing, etc.", did not
materialise, and probably ne v e r will in a dem ocratic society.
period of federal arbitration
paradoxically,

their m any

Further, the early

saw persistent em ployer hostility
c h allenges

on ju risd ic tio n

to the

resulted

system

in its

but,

extension.

However, the main point I have tried to m ake is that by and large, arbitration
principles were framed

in line with labour market norm s

and follow ed the

rates

struck by the market.

When, during

the Depression o f the 1930's, the dow nw ard course o f

was impeded by the

tribunal's m inim um

wage prescriptions,

the market

these

were

adjusted

downward to meet what was generally seen as the econom ic requirem ents o f the
times.

The early postwar period was one of ambivalence for the tribunal.

Kelly saw the

function of the Court as holding back inflation, sim ilar to what had been its
function in war time.

In the circum stances o f a changed econom ic

environment, this view

was

Kirby approach:
promoting

unsustainable, and

A c c o m m o d a tiv e

industrial

p eace

by

arbitration

c o n ciliatio n

was
with

overtaken
prim a ry

rath e r

th an

and industrial

by the

e m p h a sis

im p o sin g

realistic
on

by

arbitration

economic policy objectives which were outside the reach o f the tribunal.
alternative, to become irrelevant and
services, would be contrary to

ineffective

the Act.

concept of being an adjunct o f collective

The survival of the system

w hen there

was call

The

on its

In a sense, it was back to the original
bargaining.

under Sir R ichard's accom m odative

approach m ade

possible its later developm ent into a more positive econom ic force.

In the period

of Sir John Moore’s Presidency, the parties and governm ents cam e to accept the
need for a more regulated approach to wage increases to overcom e the dam aging
and self-defeating effects

o f unfettered

the Commission provided the
comprehensive

and coherent

indexation as its centre-piece.

sectional

wage

settlem ents.

A ccordingly,

means for a centralised system based on
set

o f principles

with

national

w age

a

adjustm ent

by

Later, the w aning com m itm ent o f the parties and

governm ents to the requirem ents of such

a system, led the Com m ission

to abandon

it and to revert to a less structured aw ard-by-aw ard system dom inated by
collective

barg a in in g

settlem ents.

The

wage

explosion

w hich

follow ed

brought

claim for a return to a centralised system, first through a wages pause and later
back to indexation, now underpinned by the Accord and an incom es and prices
policy.

The Com m ission com plied to facilitate the achievement o f economic and

industrial

stability

but

sp e cifie d

the

req u irem e n ts

upon

parties

and

governm ents

for such an outcom e.

In the early part o f Mr. Justice M addem 's Presidency, a serious balance of
paym ents

crisis

further decline
policy.

and
in

the

need

living

for substantial

standards,

called

productivity

for a more

im p rovem ent

to prevent

ente rp rise-b a sed

wage

Again, although the Com m ission and the other tribunals were to be an

instrum ent

for de v e lo p m en t o f a better balance

between m acro

and

micro

objectives, the sources for the change were the parties and governm ents;
is their c o m m itm ent to the new

system

and it

which m ade its im plem entation possible.

Thus from Higgins to Kirby, to Moore and to M addem , each phase was conditioned
by new problem s calling for a new approach and new requirem ents.
developm ent o f the
econom ic

po lic y ,

arbitration

reflects

economic m anagem ent.
such

ch a n g in g

into

tim es

becom ing part o f the m achinery
and

the

changed

requirem ents

of

and this

was

recognised

by the

parties

generally

But the essential condition for the viability o f the tribunal’s

wage policy rem ain in essence the same as it had been in earlier times;
what the C om m ission

for

In a way, the nature and scale o f wage m ovem ents made

a d e v e lo p m en t necessary,

and by governm ents.

system

The

can

in short,

accom plish depends essentially on w hat the main

parties will allow it to do.

Legislation to limit obstructive actions by the parties

and to improve the structure o f the system can go some way to strengthening the
power o f the Com m ission.
and

v o lu ntariness

works best.

rem ain

But the scope in this direction is marginal.
the

substantial

basis

on

which

the

Consensus

arbitration

system

To be viable, its policy must have broad acceptance, however

grudging, from the m ain parties and be supported by governm ents.

In must not

apply its own doctrines and values but should try to establish those held generally
by the com m unity and by the labour market in particular.
the C om m ission

is a facilitator rather than a prim e mover or an innovator,

reactive rather than proactive.
a r b i t r a t o r 's

role

It is in this sense that

cannot

be

A m om ent's thought should m ake it plain that an

otherwise.
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Writing in 1970, Sir Richard Kirby said:

... the Com m ission should not attempt to impose an unacceptable solution on
the parties involved sim ply because of its legal position.

I again stress that

it must seek decisions which will be accepted, even though there may be
disagreement with them ,

as being both appropriate and ju s t

in the

particular circum stances o f each case and to the extent that the
acceptability is determ ined by the nature in

which they are fram ed . . . 3 8

Of course, the arbitration system has not been free o f critics.

T hrough

the years

up the present, there have been those who as a m atter o f doctrine regard the
system with hostility.

But to be persuasive, doctrine needs to be tested in the real

labour market, not an assum ed ideal one.

Those^^

w ho at present believe in the

virtues of a deregulated labour market (by which is probably m eant a greatly
reduced role of tribunals) give too little weight to the notion o f "fairness" in the
labour market and the concentration of economic pow er in it.
unemployment

much

h ig h e r

than

currently

p rev a ils,

W ithout a level of

d e re g u la tio n

w ould

give

these forces of the market free rein, as was the case before 1975 and in 1981/82.
The regulatory mould of the kind now applying, has facilitated
degree of wage

restraint

accom panied

by

reduced

industrial

a rem arkable

action,

allow ing

employment to grow and the rate of unemployment to fall in a period of severe
balance of payments crisis.

From past experience, it is difficult to believe that

such an outcome could have been achieved in a deregulated system.

Then there are cynics4 ^ who regard the Com m ission's ability to adapt and survive
as due to its devilishly cunning capacity for self-serving.
basis of the "capture" theory that the C om m ission

and o ther industrial

take a life of their own and promote their own interest
interest.

It has been said on the

rather than the

Such assertion without evidence deserve no credit.

Any

tribunals
public

institution, by

fulfilling the terms of its charter, could be said to be furthering it own interest
and survival.

The test surely is whether it operates inconsistently with its

charter and subverts the public interest in favour o f its own interest.

This is a

matter of evidence which has so far not been presented.

May I finally make a few concluding observations.

To argue that the Commission is a facilitator rather than a prime mover and that
its capacity to deliver one or other systems depends ultimately on the will of the
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parties

is not to under-rate

econom ic policy.

its critical

im portance in industrial

relations

and in

I said earlier that although the C om m ission and the State

tribunals are not a sufficient condition for the system to work, they are a
necessary

c o n d itio n .

The longstanding history

o f the C om m ission, its m em ory

strength to its authority and acceptability as a facilitator.
institution which

and its adaptability, give
It is not the kind of

can be created in a hurry. Over the years, its procedures,

especially in national wage m atters, have been

refined and

speeded up.

It is a

forum for public debate on im portant industrial relations and wage issues.
reasoned

decisions

are

intended

to

have

role on the issues being determ ined.

an e x p lanatory,

persuasive

Its

and educative

The practice o f anam inous single decisions

has strengthened

the force o f its decisions.

Further, the

decisions is also

enhanced by lim iting the life o f any set

than two years, to be followed by a review.

acceptability o f its
of principles

to no more

Last but not least, the judgmental

skills o f those who make up the Com m ission in national cases, their ability to
d istin g u ish substance

from

the

rhetroic

which

is a feature

o f some submissions

and m edia releases o f the parties, their sensitivity on w hat is likely to work and
how far to go in a particular direction

- all these

for the successful operation o f the system.
ec o n o m ists.
system

as

for

P helps

Brown,

a "precious legacy".41

system in
way

Sir H enry

It

the difficult Kirby period
future

fle x ib ility

under

has

qualities and more are essential

A distinguished English labour
described

the

A ustralian

arbitration

is fair to add that the adaptability shown by
helped to preserve

different

the

this legacy and showed

the

conditions.

The next point I wish to m ake is that a distinction should be drawn between the
form ulation

o f p rin cip les

kind which

has applied since 1975.

The form er is

w hich

C o m m ission

consideration

the

and their

gives careful

im plem entation in a centralised

a given set of principles and avoids adopting a system
of what I have had to say relates tothis issue.
the

o th er

hand,

is an a dm inistrative

regardless o f the pow er o f the party.
requirem ent.

process

system

o f the

a quasi-legislative process in
to the

general

acceptability

which is likely to fail.

The application o f

of

Most

principles, on

in which consistency is essential

The integrity o f the system depends on this

It is here that the Higgins "judicial"

approach should be applied.

Finally, the history o f the arbitration system shows its ability to adapt to
c hanging econom ic and industrial needs.
institution.

In recent

times,

It is not an ossified centralist

in line with changed circum stances,

it has shown the

capacity to move
w ith in

to

individual

a centralised system .

award

and

e n te rprise-specific

wage

adjustments

It has retained the centralised um brella to ensure

that the macro requirem ents o f the system - the avoidance o f excessive general
money wage increases - arc not violated.

As in the past, the future of the

Commission will depend on its ability to sense and grasp the requirem ents o f a
changing industrial society.
which calls

for the

If these requirem ents turn out to be o f the kind

abandonm ent o f a centralised role or a differently

role or one which operates

m ore

the system sufficient resilence

by conciliation

than

arbitration,

to m eet these requirem ents.

there

structured
is within

T he direction in

which it moves will depend ultimately on those who are affected by its operation unions, employers and

gov e rn m e n ts

- and

approach is necessary for its success.

whose com m itm ent

to a particular

The C om m ission has amply dem onstrated

that it has no vested interest in and no preconceived policy for any one approach.
On the basis of its history, it is reasonable to suppose that the Com m ission will
facilitate the operation
perceived to

be, in

o f the

particular approach which

the circum stances, best for the public interest.

mistakes and miscalculations from time to time.
relations is

for the

is both

m illenium .

But perfection

sustainable

and

There will

be

in industrial
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